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Security, Development, and Diplomacy: Solving the Puzzle of the US-Sub-Saharan Africa Strategy?

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ABSTRACT

Several strands of US strategy towards sub-Saharan Africa have emerged since the mid-1980s. The growing complexity and sophistication of the United States' engagement with Africa points to its increased interest in the African continent, even though it cannot be said that Africa has risen to the top of the country's foreign policy agenda. Security and development, connected through diplomacy, remain the main pillars of US-sub-Saharan Africa relations, with economic transformation gaining rapid ground. The US Department of Defense, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the US State Department are key actors in US policy toward sub-Saharan Africa, respectively implementing the three Ds of defence, development and diplomacy. An analysis of the US-sub-Saharan Africa strategy also brings to light the significant complementarities between US and European approaches and priorities, which actors on both sides of the Atlantic will need to capitalise on in the coming years. Given the current budgetary constraints and inward-looking trends in both the US and many European countries, existing coordination and cooperation mechanisms should be examined and strengthened to ensure greater alignment and effectiveness of transatlantic partners' engagement with African countries on security and development issues.

*US foreign policy | Sub-Saharan Africa | Economic aid | Military missions |
Transatlantic relations | European Union | EU Global Strategy*

keywords

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Introduction

Debates about US leadership have been rife over the past decades, and have included fears about a possible retrenchment of the US from world affairs. The US provides a significant amount of development aid to sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and is the largest bilateral donor for peace operations. US-African relations have become more sophisticated over the last two decades as evidenced by a growing community of American Africanists¹ and the growing importance of Africa in the US foreign policy agenda. This paper first offers an overview of US strategy and core interests in SSA. While economic considerations are gaining ground, security and development remain the primary lenses through which US engagement with SSA is viewed. Furthermore, development policy has in recent years been put on a par with diplomacy and defence as instruments for the promotion of US interests abroad. In the context of relations with SSA, this is particularly apparent as development cannot take place without security, and security cannot be sustained without development. Accordingly, this paper focuses on US understandings of security and development cooperation with this region, paying particular attention to the role of the different agencies in an attempt to assess the relative weight of civilian and military concerns. Indeed, the relationships between the three Ds of defence, development and diplomacy, as represented by the US Department of Defense (DoD), the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the State Department, will be at the core of this analysis. Economic diplomacy is a significant and growing part of US engagement with the region and will be addressed briefly. A more in-depth analysis of US-SSA economic relations is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. The latter part of the paper identifies areas of complementarity with European Union (EU) approaches and priorities.

¹ Most of the top US foreign policy think tanks work on SSA in one capacity or another from publications and research to initiatives or programmes dealing with the region.

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· Paper produced in the framework of a project entitled "The EU, the US and the International Strategic Dimension of Sub-Saharan Africa: Peace, Security and Development in the Horn of Africa", September 2016. Copyright © Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS).

1. The evolution of the US's engagement with SSA

Key turning points in US approaches to and strategic orientation towards SSA can be identified in recent years. While the US boasts longstanding links with the African continent, engagement with Africa has historically not ranked at the top of the US foreign policy agenda, and interest in the continent had long been framed in humanitarian terms rather than those of strategic engagement. After a period of proxy conflicts and indirect support to “likeminded” regimes during the Cold War, the US largely disengaged from the continent in the 1990s. Prompted in part by the failure of intervention in Somalia in 1993 and the fallout of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, planners at the DoD stated in an official position paper published in 1995 that they could “see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa” and that “America’s security interests in Africa are very limited.”² Three years later, the simultaneous attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania started a shift, which was later confirmed with the 9/11 attacks in 2001. By 2002, the national security strategy published by President George W. Bush’s administration included Africa as one of the fronts in the global War on Terror.³ The strategic importance of Africa for US security interests was further affirmed by the creation of the DoD Unified Combatant Command for Africa (AFRICOM) in 2007.⁴ The decision by President Bush to establish AFRICOM to “enhance [US] efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa”⁵ “by strengthening

² US Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for Africa*, August 1995, p. 3, <http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA297401>. See also J. Peter Pham, “AFRICOM’s Evolution from Bush to Obama”, in Maya Kandel (ed.), *U.S. Strategy in Africa*, in *Études de l’IRSEM*, No. 36 (December 2014), p. 33, <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/base-de-medias/documents-telechargeables/irsem/pdf-publications/etudes/etude-de-l-irsem-n-36-en-2014>.

³ Maya Kandel, “U.S. Strategy in Africa: Risks and Contradictions of the ‘Light Footprint’ Strategy”, in Maya Kandel (ed.), *U.S. Strategy in Africa*, in *Études de l’IRSEM*, No. 36 (December 2014), p. 16, <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/base-de-medias/documents-telechargeables/irsem/pdf-publications/etudes/etude-de-l-irsem-n-36-en-2014>.

⁴ AFRICOM’s Service Component Commands and Theater Special Operations Command component are (1) US Army Africa: operating from Vicenza, Italy, which conducts sustained security engagements with African land forces to promote security, stability, and peace (1,600 personnel); (2) US Naval Forces Africa: headquartered in Naples, Italy, its primary mission being to improve the maritime security capability and capacity of African partners; staff are shared with US Naval Forces Europe (900 personnel); (3) US Air Force Africa: based at Ramstein Air Force Base, Germany, which conducts sustained security engagement and operations to promote air safety, security and development in Africa (954 personnel); (4) US Marine Corps Forces Africa: located in Stuttgart, it conducts operations, exercises, training and security cooperation activities throughout the African continent; staff are shared with the US Marine Corps Forces Europe (319 personnel); (5) Special Operations Command Africa: a theater Special Operations Command component, it is co-located at AFRICOM’s headquarters in Stuttgart (600 personnel); (6) Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa: located at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (approximately 2,000 personnel). See David E. Brown, *AFRICOM at 5 years: The Maturation of a new U.S. Combatant Command*, Carlisle, Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press, August 2013, p. 19, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1164.pdf>.

⁵ White House, *President Bush Creates a Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command for Africa*, 6 February 2007, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/02/20070206-3.html>.

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bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with African states and creating new opportunities to bolster their capabilities”⁶ was a significant shift and recognised that US interests in the region required long-term commitment.

After the election of Barack Obama as President in 2008, expectations soared in Africa that the continent would move up further on the list of US priorities. Interestingly, Obama’s personal history did not initially play in favour of increased attention to Africa since he and his team saw an emphasis on Africa as a liability.⁷ Indeed, US policy to SSA appeared to show significant continuity between the presidencies of Bill Clinton and Obama. The emphasis remained largely on security, strategic resources, energy, health, the promotion of democratic governance and trade. Although development assistance under Obama did not see a boost similar to that of the Bush years, Obama maintained funding levels for aid to Africa in a context of overall decreased development funding. The first US Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa was published by the White House in 2012. It presents a broad outline to guide the action of government bodies.⁸ The strategy aims to elevate the place of democracy promotion and broad-based economic growth, including through trade and investment, and establishes the reasons for US engagement in the region in terms of core national interests. These interests are defined as ensuring the security of the US, its citizens, allies, and partners; promoting strong democratic and economically vibrant states serving as strong partners for the US internationally and expanding opportunities for US trade and investment; preventing conflict and mass atrocities; and fostering broad-based, sustainable economic growth and poverty alleviation.⁹ The strategy also articulates four pillars for US policy towards the continent – namely, (1) strengthening democratic institutions; (2) spurring economic growth, trade and investment; (3) advancing peace and security; and (4) promoting opportunity and development.¹⁰ These four pillars are supplemented by the four horizontal goals of engaging with Africa’s youth and future leaders; empowering marginalised groups, with a focus on girls and women; addressing the needs of fragile and post-conflict states; and strengthening multilateral institutions and cooperation.¹¹

Economic diplomacy has perhaps seen the greatest shift in emphasis under Obama. Given the economic progress in a number of African countries in the 2000s, and with increased interest in Africa from emerging powers, China most notably, significant attention has been paid to trade and investment in recent years. While

⁶ J. Peter Pham, “AFRICOM’s Evolution from Bush to Obama”, cit., p. 31.

⁷ Nicolas van de Walle, “Obama and Africa. Lots of Hope, Not Much Change”, in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 94, No. 5 (September/October 2015), p. 54-61.

⁸ The White House, *U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa*, 14 June 2012, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/africa_strategy_2.pdf.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 1-2.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

Obama can be seen as the “first post-foreign-aid president,”¹² this change builds on steps taken during Bush’s administration, first with the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development in 2002, and then with the creation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), another US foreign aid agency, in 2004. Both initiatives marked an increased focus on outcomes over inputs and widened the sources of funding for development. Under Obama, Trade Africa, launched in 2013 to bolster internal and regional trade within Africa and to expand and strengthen economic ties between Africa, the US and other global markets, together with the first US-African Leaders Summit in Washington in August 2014, attest to the changing tone of US-Africa relations.

2. The US as a peace and security actor in SSA

The US Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa highlights “Advanc[ing] Peace and Security” as one of its four pillars. US engagement is articulated around a set of actions, including countering terrorism; advancing regional security cooperation and security sector reform; preventing transnational criminal threats; preventing conflict; and supporting initiatives to promote peace and security.¹³ By and large the US Government, with the State Department, the DoD and USAID, prioritise building Africa’s defensive capacities as a means of achieving the stated goals and actions. Obama’s promise in 2014 to add 5 billion dollars to counterterrorism partnerships globally points to ongoing support for military support programmes in Africa in the near future.¹⁴ Furthermore, in its FY2016 budget, the State Department listed peace and security assistance as “one of the United States’ highest priorities” in SSA, pointing to state fragility, conflict and transnational security issues as areas of concern.¹⁵ The FY2016 request included nearly 470 million dollars for security sector reform and capacity-building; stabilisation operations; counterterrorism and counternarcotics initiatives; maritime safety and security programmes; and other conflict-prevention and mitigation efforts. However, the complex web of legal authorities and programmes under the State Department and DoD makes it difficult to gain a comprehensive view of how much security assistance is provided to each African country.¹⁶

US security engagement in Africa is shaped by short-term concerns about countering terrorism, and a long-term mission to train African armies to handle future crises and transnational threats. It focuses on three geographical areas as

¹² Nicolas van de Walle, “Obama and Africa”, cit., p. 60.

¹³ The White House, *U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa*, cit., p. 4-5.

¹⁴ Interviews with senior US experts, 2016.

¹⁵ US Department of State, *FY 2016 Congressional Budget Justification - Foreign Assistance Appendix 2*, February 2015, p. 302, <http://www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/fy2016cbj/pdf>.

¹⁶ Lauren Ploch Blanchard, *Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health* (Hearing: U.S. Security Assistance in Africa), 4 June 2015, p. 3, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/security-assistance-in-africa-06-04-15>.

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priorities: East Africa, with an emphasis on Somalia and the fight against piracy; North Africa, the Sahel and West Africa, dealing largely with affiliates of Al-Qaida and stability in the Gulf of Guinea; and the Great Lakes region, including South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda.¹⁷ Contributions to peace operations in Africa involve numerous government bodies, including the National Security Council staff, the State Department, DoD, and US missions to the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU), and they build on relationships with international organisations, including the UN, the AU, regional economic communities (RECs) and the EU.¹⁸ The US supports the AU's peace and security programmes, including assisting the African Standby Force (ASF), providing expertise to help to develop a maritime strategy, and improving the medical planning capability of the AU's Peace Support Operations Division. The US also provides communication equipment and training in the areas of strategic communications, conflict monitoring and analysis, and military planning,¹⁹ and it deploys Special Forces and military advisors in support of both the AU-led Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Since 2007, US support for AMISOM has amounted to 258 million dollars, making the US the largest individual financial contributor to AU peacekeeping operations in Somalia.²⁰ The US supported the building of the UN's Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) headquarters in Bangui in 2014 and deployed troops later that year to support the UN and AU "health-keeping" missions in West Africa.²¹ In the Sahel, the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership strengthens the border security and counterterrorist capacities of Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia. In terms of military assistance, Sudan, Ethiopia and South Africa count among the main recipients, as do Somalia, Mauritania and Chad.²² Furthermore, relative to the size of their armed forces, Burundi, Uganda, Ghana and Sierra Leone also receive significant bilateral aid.²³ In 2014, President Obama announced two new security initiatives: the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP) and the Security Governance Initiative (SGI).²⁴ The goal of the former is to build capacity for rapid deployment, and 110 million dollars annually over three to five years has been pledged to pursue this goal in six countries. APRRP will work with Senegal, Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda on a bilateral level and does not have an AU component. The latter initiative focuses on building military and

¹⁷ Maya Kandel, "U.S. Strategy in Africa", cit.; Nicolas van de Walle, "Obama and Africa", cit.

¹⁸ Paul D. Williams, "Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa", in *Council Special Reports*, No. 73 (May 2015), p. 11, <http://on.cfr.org/29PjXTs>.

¹⁹ US Department of State, *The United States and the African Union. Fact Sheet*, 19 April 2011, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/04/161212.htm>.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Paul D. Williams, "Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa", cit., p. 13.

²² For Chad the figures are relative to the size of the country. Maya Kandel, "U.S. Strategy in Africa", cit., p. 22.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Paul D. Williams, "Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa", cit., p. 21.

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civilian capacities to fight extremism and terrorism. The SGI will start in Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Tunisia, with 65 million dollars allocated to the first year of the initiative.²⁵ USAID is also present in the security field with programmes on conflict prevention and countering violent extremism.²⁶

While Africa's relevance to the US has increased, the fundamental principle of to keep US forces out of direct combat roles in the region remains in place, with the exception of short and infrequent interventions where vital US interests or lives are at risk.²⁷ The US's security approach towards Africa is one of "light footprint" and "leading from behind." This was described by DoD as an "innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint [approach] to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities."²⁸ This approach is based largely on the cooperation and training of national armies, which are expected to eventually become the primary security providers in the region, living up to the promise of "African solutions to African problems." Reliance on US Special Forces as "tactical force[s] with a strategic impact", regionally specialised brigades, and the use of surveillance drones and military drone strikes is unlikely to change given ongoing budgetary constraints and the changing nature of security threats.²⁹ DoD's geographic combatant commands are referred to as CCMDs. In contrast to other US commands, AFRICOM is referred to as a "CCMD Plus" because it combines the roles attributed to traditional geographic combatant commands with a broader "soft power" mandate to build a stable security environment and a larger allocation of personnel from other US government agencies to carry out this "soft power" mandate.³⁰ AFRICOM's status as a "CCMD Plus" and the inclusion of a broader "soft power" mandate have been the subject of discussion in Washington, and represents a "major break [in] conventional doctrinal mentalities both within the armed services themselves and between government agencies."³¹

The idea that, in Africa, DoD should focus more on preventing wars than fighting them has been received with mixed feelings. While the State Department and USAID welcome and recognise the ability of DoD to leverage resources and to

²⁵ Manuel Manrique Gil, *Something New Out of Africa? Chinese, US and EU Strategies for the Continent*, Brussels, European Parliament, April 2015, p. 12-13, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/549031/EXPO_IDA\(2015\)549031_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/549031/EXPO_IDA(2015)549031_EN.pdf).

²⁶ USAID website, *Where We Work: Africa*, updated 12 April 2016, <https://www.usaid.gov/where-we-work/africa>.

²⁷ William M. Bellamy, "African Security. Time for a Change in Doctrine?", in Richard Downie (ed.), *Africa in the Wider World*, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2014, p. 4-6, <https://www.csis.org/node/26464>.

²⁸ US Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, January 2012, p. 3, http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf.

²⁹ Maya Kandel, "U.S. Strategy in Africa", cit., p. 18-19.

³⁰ David E. Brown, *AFRICOM at 5 years*, cit., p. 21.

³¹ J. Peter Pham, "Getting AFRICOM Right", in *World Defense Review*, 15 February 2007, <https://shar.es/1ZnXmG>. See also Lauren Ploch, "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa", in *CRS Reports for Congress*, No. RL34003 (22 July 2011), p. 6, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf>.

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organise complex operations, the new mandate raises concerns that AFRICOM might overestimate its capabilities and its diplomatic role, or seek to pursue activities outside its core mandate.³² Coordination between the State Department and DoD focuses on funding, training local security forces and mitigating the risk of recruitment by terrorist organisations. However, DoD manages an increasing number of security assistance schemes, including training and equipment programmes. Military assistance under the authority of DoD has more than doubled since 2005 and is directed more and more towards Africa.³³ The highly unequal allocation of resources between DoD, the State Department, and USAID has raised the question of the State Department and USAID's ability to act as "equal partners," and of the possible militarisation of development and diplomacy.³⁴ In 2009 the State Department noted that AFRICOM "is stepping into a void created by a lack of resources for traditional development and public diplomacy."³⁵ While AFRICOM may not have taken over the interagency lead between the DoD, the State Department and USAID, it has become a primary implementer of US foreign policy in Africa.³⁶ This view is echoed by US officials, who further contextualise disparities in funding by pointing to the relative cost of the activities implemented by each agency.³⁷ Furthermore, AFRICOM's funding is relatively limited, given the security challenges on the continent, a point which has been acknowledged by the AFRICOM leadership.³⁸

Although the US's focus on training and capacity-building is understandable from a political perspective, especially for a region which is not at the top of the list of US interests globally, the effectiveness of this approach is contested. While AFRICOM's activities are based on the premise that the ability of African countries to manage their own security challenges needs to be developed, many of these countries currently have very weak security capabilities and do not have the financial resources to upgrade their capabilities to deal even with short-term priorities.³⁹ Since the War on Terror began, including in African countries, the US has sought to work with and through key countries to address threats on the continent under the banner of "African solutions to African problems." Although this approach implies limited costs and US involvement on the ground, it has disadvantages. First among these

³² Lauren Ploch, "Africa Command", cit.

³³ Maya Kandel, "U.S. Strategy in Africa", cit.

³⁴ Lauren Ploch, "Africa Command", cit.

³⁵ US Department of State, *Inspection of the Bureau of African Affairs* (OIG Report No. ISP-I-09-63), August 2009, p. 8, <https://oig.state.gov/reports/8227>. See also Maya Kandel, "U.S. Strategy in Africa", cit., p. 16.

³⁶ David E. Brown, *AFRICOM at 5 years*, cit.

³⁷ Interviews with senior US officials, 2016.

³⁸ "Unfortunately, the resources the command requires if it is to do even this much have not been readily forthcoming – and that was before the fiscal austerity. In fact, AFRICOM Commander General Ham acknowledged earlier this year that 'due to the vast challenges and opportunities on the continent, as well as current fiscal realities, we have prioritized regions in Africa to better focus our exercises, operations, and security cooperation activities.'" J. Peter Pham, "AFRICOM's Evolution from Bush to Obama", cit., p. 40.

³⁹ Ibid.

is the choice of partner countries and the consequent risk of counterproductive effects. Bronwyn Bruton and Paul Williams point to East Africa, where the US proxy approach has “arguably created more problems than it has successfully addressed” in Somalia.⁴⁰ The long-term consequence of this approach in East Africa includes raising the risk of retaliation against partner countries, possible corrupt and abusive behaviour displayed by African armies in the field, consolidating preferred power structures and advancing the agenda of partner countries rather than keeping the peace. Depending on the partner country, addressing security issues by proxy has also reinforced the view that security concerns trump concerns of democracy and human rights in Africa.⁴¹ APRRP, for instance, will initially work with Senegal, Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, a number of which do not boast strong governance track records and whose military has abused civilians at home and abroad.⁴² The increase in peacekeeping operations in Africa has also shown some of the limits of the US approach. Training programmes have been broadened rather than deepened, training African peacekeepers to perform relatively basic peacekeeping tasks while struggling in several other areas. These programmes also have difficulty ensuring that the personnel trained and equipment transferred are then deployed to peacekeeping operations. It is also unclear to what extent an initiative such as APRRP matches the deployment capacity of the countries chosen.⁴³ Furthermore, APRRP is driven by the White House, and it is not clear to what extent and at what speed it will be implemented by other US government bodies.

Three Maghreb countries – Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia – currently enjoy the status of “major non-NATO ally.” Peter Pham argues that the US should develop “special” relationships with key African countries and that, with reforms and increased capacity, relationships with countries such as Nigeria, Ethiopia or Kenya could be formally elevated, if not necessarily to the level of “major non-NATO ally.”⁴⁴ Deepening relationships with key African partners would complement existing cooperation with NATO allies such as France and the UK. After a decade of progressive withdrawal, France is militarily re-engaging in the Sahel. Limited assets and resources notwithstanding, France’s operational knowledge of the region and interest in the Sahel have proved to be valuable for the renewal of Franco-US cooperation. The US and the EU also cooperate closely on matters of security. In 2011 they signed a framework agreement on US participation in EU crisis management operations. This provides the legal mechanism for the US to contribute civilian personnel to EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

⁴⁰ Bronwyn Bruton and Paul D. Williams, “The Hidden Costs of Outsourcing the ‘War on Terrorism’”, in Maya Kandel (ed.), *U.S. Strategy in Africa*, in *Études de l’IRSEM*, No. 36 (December 2014), p. 69, <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/base-de-medias/documents-telechargeables/irsem/pdf-publications/etudes/etude-de-l-irsem-n-36-en-2014>.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Paul D. Williams, “Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa”, cit., p. 21-22.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ J. Peter Pham, “Africa”, in The John Hay Initiative, *Choosing to Lead. American Foreign Policy for a Disordered World*, October 2015, p. 59, <http://www.choosingtolead.net/book>.

missions and strengthens options for practical, on-the-ground US-EU coordination in crisis situations. The EU and the US are also negotiating an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, to facilitate cooperation on logistical support. The US contributes to the EU Security Sector Reform mission in the DRC (EUSEC DRC), and EU and US personnel and forces on the ground have worked together in Mali, Somalia and the Horn of Africa.⁴⁵ On political issues, including developments in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa, weekly exchanges between special envoys complement the monthly State Department-European External Action Service (EEAS) calls and there is significant in-country coordination, including joint demarches on specific occasions.⁴⁶ China's increasing security interests and engagement in Africa might open up other avenues for cooperation in Africa to the US.

3. The US as a development actor in SSA

A new concept of development is gaining ground in US development cooperation, with a shift in emphasis from aid-driven development to development driven by economic growth. Aid is mentioned once in President Obama's US Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, while issues of economic growth are mentioned under pillars two and four: "Spur Economic Growth, Trade, and Investment" and "Promote Opportunity and Development."⁴⁷ The economic angle was also prominent during the 2014 US-Africa Leaders Summit.⁴⁸ More than 33 billion dollars worth of agreements, new initiatives and investments were announced during the summit⁴⁹ and new commitments were made to the Doing Business in Africa Campaign,⁵⁰

⁴⁵ The White House, *U.S.-EU Cooperation on Common Security and Defense Policy*, 26 March 2014, <http://go.wh.gov/X3spsm>.

⁴⁶ Joint demarches have taken place in the Great Lakes, for instance. Interviews with senior US officials, 2016.

⁴⁷ The White House, *U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa*, cit., p. 3 and 5.

⁴⁸ The US-Africa Leaders Summit was the largest event held by a US president with African heads of state and government. The summit aimed to strengthen ties between the US and Africa, and specifically advanced the administration's focus on trade and investment in Africa and meant to highlight the government's commitment to Africa's security and democratic development. See The White House, *U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit*, Washington, 4-6 August 2014, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/us-africa-leaders-summit>.

⁴⁹ The FY2014 requested budget for bilateral and regional foreign assistance in SSA was almost 33 billion dollars (including development assistance, economic support fund, foreign military financing, global health programmes – state, global health programmes – USAID, international disaster assistance, international military education and training, international narcotics control and law enforcement, international organisations and programmes, non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, demining and related programmes, peacekeeping operations and other accounts. See US Department of State, *FY 2014 Congressional Budget Justification - Foreign Assistance Summary Tables*, May 2013, <http://www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/fy2014cbj/pdf>.

⁵⁰ The Doing Business in Africa campaign, launched in 2012, is furthering the president's vision to help US businesses identify and take advantage of the many export and investment opportunities in SSA. See The White House, *The Doing Business in Africa Campaign*, 5 August 2014, <http://go.wh.gov/MpShwX>.

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including interagency initiatives to support US exports and investment in Africa.⁵¹ These complement the USAID-run Trade Africa programme announced by Obama in 2013, which supports increased US-Africa trade and investment, regional integration and trade competitiveness. Given the place of agriculture in African economies, trade and agriculture programmes are closely linked in USAID's work. The Feed the Future Initiative (FtF), USAID's main vehicle for work on agriculture, aims to boost agricultural productivity and spur economic growth. While this is a global programme that combines bilateral and regional activities in Asia, Africa and Central America, the bulk of the programming is undertaken in Africa.⁵² USAID's trade work furthers and integrates FtF objectives as regional trade hubs work to increase Africa's international competitiveness, bolstering intraregional trade and ensuring food security for African populations. Congressional support for the renewal of the African Growth and Opportunity Act until 2025 also attests to the desire to create much closer links between supporting development goals in SSA and creating commercial opportunities for the US.⁵³ Economics has twice the weight in the 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) that it did in the 2010 review.⁵⁴ Even if the Obama administrations have also taken on a markedly more multilateralist approach than those of their predecessors, development cooperation remains a largely bilateral affair.

Support for democracy, human rights and good governance is one of five main areas of work for USAID and is listed as the first pillar of the US Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa. The Joint State Department-USAID FY 2014-2017 Joint Strategic Plan also includes "Protect[ing] core U.S. interests by advancing democracy and human rights and strengthening civil society" as one of five global strategic goals for US diplomacy and development cooperation.⁵⁵ While recognising the tensions which can arise between the pursuit of short-term and long-term objectives, the Joint Strategic Plan clearly links the promotion of democracy and human rights to the core US interests of addressing the causes of instability and violent extremism, and building strong political and economic partnerships.⁵⁶ While the Obama

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² See the US Government website, *Feed the Future*, <http://www.feedthefuture.gov>.

⁵³ That the EU has signed Economic Partnership Agreements with a number of regional blocs in Africa has not gone unnoticed by the US Government. Indeed, thinking on trade with Africa reflects in part growing advances in regional integration, such as the Tripartite and African Continental Free Trade Area initiatives, and in part competitive pressures from trading partners such as Canada and the EU, which are refocusing their non-reciprocal preference programmes on the poorer African countries. See US Trade Representative, *Remarks by Ambassador Michael Froman at the Beyond AGOA Hearing*, Washington, 28 January 2016, <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/speechestranscripts/2016/January/Remarks-Ambassador-Froman-Beyond-AGO-A-Hearing>. The presence of China in Africa also looms large over the push towards more economically driven relations with Africa, especially in the energy and natural resources sectors.

⁵⁴ Daniel F. Runde and Helen Moser, "The 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review", in *CSIS Commentaries*, 18 June 2015, <https://www.csis.org/node/25369>.

⁵⁵ US Department of State and USAID, *FY 2014-2017 Joint Strategic Plan*, April 2014, p. 1, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/223997.pdf>.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 30.

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administration has worked to dispel this notion, the budgetary realities give the impression that boosting economic growth takes precedence over governance and democracy promotion. US democracy assistance reached its peak in 2010, followed by a 20 per cent drop over the following four years. In 2015 this line of funding faced a cut of another 50 per cent. A significant element of democracy support is offered to SSA and cuts have therefore impacted on programming in the region. In SSA, almost 500 million dollars was allocated to economic development programmes and 115 million dollars to democracy, human rights and governance programmes in 2015. The top five recipients – South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Nigeria and Kenya – received more than 65 per cent of the total amounts allocated to democracy, human rights and governance assistance.⁵⁷

Although health and energy do not feature prominently in the new US Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, listed under the “Promot[ing] Opportunity and Development” pillar, both have been central to the articulation of US policy towards Africa and interests in the region. The very recent fall in oil prices and the energy revolution taking place in the US with the discovery of alternative energy sources have altered the picture somewhat, but access to strategic resources has long counted among US interests in the region. In 2014, Obama launched Power Africa, a 7 billion dollar programme to develop Africa’s energy sector by providing technical assistance, financing and investment support, and for which a memorandum of understanding was signed with the EU to increase US-EU coordination.⁵⁸ According to Freedom House, budget cuts in democracy programming are also partially due to a reallocation of funding from USAID or the MCC to programmes such as Power Africa.⁵⁹ Supporting Africa to cope with its many humanitarian challenges is another priority of US-Africa relations. According to Peter Pham, while not quite an “interest” in political realist terms, the focus on humanitarian concerns, and health in particular, has been “part and parcel of the country’s foreign policy throughout its history and has led to repeated instances where domestic politics create a foreign policy ‘priority’ in the absence of a hard ‘interest.’”⁶⁰ The decision by Obama to deploy US military personnel in the fight against the Ebola epidemic in West Africa, at a significant cost,⁶¹ exemplifies the importance of health in the calculus of US interest. More than 5 billion dollars was allocated to health programmes in SSA in 2015. While many of these have been successful in terms of delivery and access to health services, the US President’s

⁵⁷ See the ForeignAssistance.gov website, <http://beta.foreignassistance.gov/explore>.

⁵⁸ European Commission, *European Union and the U.S. Power Africa Initiative Join Forces to Assist Partner Countries to Reduce Energy Poverty and Increase Access to Electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 14 July 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/web-release-power-africa-eu-mou-addis_en.pdf.

⁵⁹ Freedom House, *Five Things Everyone Should Know about U.S. Policy toward Africa*, 24 July 2014, <https://freedomhouse.org/node/45933>.

⁶⁰ J. Peter Pham, “AFRICOM’s Evolution from Bush to Obama”, cit., p. 35.

⁶¹ The military component alone of this effort is conservatively estimated to cost the Pentagon more than 1 billion dollars. Ibid., p. 35-36.

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Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in particular, George Ingram and Steven Rocker argue that the way in which US health assistance to SSA is carried out – financing the delivery of health services rather than building sustainable health systems – cannot be maintained in the long run.⁶²

According to the White House, the adoption of the UN's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in September 2015 comes at a time of growing bipartisan consensus on the "importance of global development, and direct philanthropic contributions from the American people."⁶³ The first US Global Development Policy was published in 2010 and emphasizes many of the principles and objectives laid out in the 2030 Agenda. In this context, the US will build on existing (PEPFAR, FtF, Power Africa, and Let Girls Learn) and new (USAID's Vision for Ending Extreme Poverty) initiatives and prioritise action in areas that include global health, food security and nutrition, energy, reduction of extreme poverty, gender equality, education and open government to fulfill its commitments to the 2030 Agenda.⁶⁴

Thinking in Washington is moving towards a "whole of government" approach, comparable to the EU's comprehensive approach. As such, while a significant portion of engagement with Africa falls under the mandate of USAID, programmes are meant to be carried out in cooperation with the relevant departments such as the United States Trade Representative, the Department of Energy or the Department of Agriculture. The 2015 QDDR, however, does not emphasise coordination with government agencies, outside the State Department and USAID, which play a role in US development assistance, and it does not propose concrete ways for agencies to provide supporting roles.⁶⁵ According to interviews conducted with senior US experts, coordination beyond interagency coordination between the State Department and USAID at the level of regional bureaus remains limited and in-country coordination is largely personality-driven.⁶⁶ Furthermore, while USAID budgets are supposed to be driven largely by country-level analysis, input and priorities, significant portions of the budget are reserved through congressional earmarks or presidential initiatives, limiting the impact of the ground-up approach.

The US is now increasingly involved in building capacity for regional organisations, which was long seen as the purview of the EU. Indeed, in recent years, USAID has given a more prominent role to regional organisations in its strategic planning.

⁶² George Ingram and Steven Rocker, "U.S. Development Assistance and Sub-Saharan Africa: Opportunities for Engagement", in John P. Banks et al., *Top Five Reasons Why Africa Should Be a Priority for the United States*, Washington, Brookings, March 2013, p. 15, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/04/africa-priority-united-states>.

⁶³ The White House, *U.S. Global Development Policy and Agenda 2030*, 27 September 2015, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/27/fact-sheet-us-global-development-policy-and-agenda-2030>.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Daniel F. Runde and Helen Moser, "The 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review", cit.

⁶⁶ Interviews with senior US experts, 2016.

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This change reflects both a belief that regional integration will further economic development and stability in Africa, and an attempt to better integrate USAID and the State Department while more effectively harnessing US resources, expertise and cooperating with allies.⁶⁷ The State Department's first QDDR, published in 2010, urges regional bureaus to assert themselves to address increasingly regional and transnational policy challenges and to "develop more effective regional strategies on core policy objectives, situate bilateral relationships in a regional context, and strengthen our engagement with regional institutions."⁶⁸ USAID programming, however, continues to follow thematic logics by policy area rather than regional lines. To a certain extent, this approach hinders the development of longer-term regional strategies.⁶⁹ Furthermore, the recently published second QDDR, while reiterating the need to "strengthen the integration of [the State Department's] regional and functional bureaus,"⁷⁰ does not feature prominent support for regional processes and organisations.

Cooperation between the EU and the US on development is institutionalised through the High Level Consultative Group on Development, which was relaunched in 2009 to hold annual ministerial meetings meant to advance and guide EU-US cooperation both at policy and country level. The dialogue brings together the Directorate-General Development and Cooperation (EuropeAid), in close cooperation and consultation with the EEAS and its US & Canada Division, and USAID and the State Department's Bureau of European Affairs. EU member states are also involved in the consultations.⁷¹ The EEAS's Africa Division and the State Department's African Affairs Bureau hold monthly calls for greater coordination on political issues. The OECD's Development Co-operation Directorate also serves as a platform for exchange and cooperation between the US and other donors, including a large number of EU member states. According to US officials, the US is broadening cooperation with non-traditional partners. China, for instance, has become an important partner on health issues.⁷² Analysts in the US have also called for increased use of triangular cooperation with Brazil.

⁶⁷ John Kotsopoulos and Madeleine Goerg, "Interregional Relations between North America and Africa", in *Atlantic Future Working Papers*, No. 20 (November 2015), p. 6, <http://www.atlanticfuture.eu/contents/view/north-america-and-africa>.

⁶⁸ US Department of State and USAID, *Leading through Civilian Power. The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, December 2010, p. 52, <http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/2010>.

⁶⁹ John Kotsopoulos and Madeleine Goerg, "Interregional Relations between North America and Africa", cit., p. 15.

⁷⁰ US Department of State and USAID, *Enduring Leadership in a Dynamic World. Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, May 2015, p. 15, <http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/2015>.

⁷¹ Alexander Gaus and Wade Hoxtell, "The EU-US Development Dialogue: Past, Present and Future", in *GPPi Working Papers*, July 2013, <http://www.gppi.net/publications/innovation-in-development/article/the-eu-us-development-dialogue-past-present-and-future>.

⁷² Interviews with senior US officials, 2016.

4. Recommendations for US and EU engagement with SSA

The US and Europe are SSA's largest development and security partners and will continue to play a significant role in the region in the coming years. However, given the current budgetary constraints, faced by the US, the EU and its member states, and their limited appetite for increased development and security cooperation with SSA, transatlantic partners should look for points of convergence and complementarity in their engagement with the region. The EU and the US need to think creatively about new, leaner⁷³ and bottom-up models for development cooperation that are better suited to the changing global context.

On institutions: As the US moves towards a "whole of government" approach and attempts to integrate security and development cooperation more, lessons learned from the EU's experience with the institutional tools and mechanisms of the comprehensive approach could be valuable. Indeed, beyond the political commitment to a "whole of government" approach, few institutional mechanisms have been introduced to facilitate coordination among these three areas. Implementation, on the one hand, of the "whole of government" approach and, on the other, of the comprehensive approach, which the EU seeks to expand, will need to be grounded in best practice to deliver impact and would benefit from lessons learned on either side of the Atlantic. The launch of the EU Global Strategy should also prompt EU and US policy-makers to exchange on their respective articulation of diplomacy, defence and development policies as means of addressing current challenges. While AFRICOM has become one of the primary implementers of US foreign policy towards the region, the EU has traditionally been more reluctant to use development tools for security cooperation, and budgets earmarked for security cooperation remain lower than development aid budgets.⁷⁴ However, building on the European Commission's latest efforts to strengthen the link between security and development, the EU Global Strategy mentions the need for greater connectivity between "diplomacy, CSDP and development"⁷⁵ in addressing

⁷³ Eliot Pence proposes a "lean development" model based on four cornerstones: "decentralize, open up, experiment, and adapt." He suggests decentralising development cooperation to bring it closer to its constituencies, creating closer feedback loops and building on communities' existing systems and processes; opening development agencies to the public to drive programming by actual rather than perceived demand, and shifting the role of development agencies to incubators rather than implementers; using experimental approaches; and promoting adaptability. See Eliot Pence, "Lean Development: A New Theory of Development Assistance", in *Yale Journal of International Affairs*, 8 June 2015, <http://yalejournal.org/?p=5606>. The EU and the US can build on the expertise of their respective development communities to create development cooperation models fit for the coming decades.

⁷⁴ Jérôme Pigné, "The Indirect Approach of the United States to the Sahel: Developments in Strategy and a Comparative Approach with the European Union", in Maya Kandel (ed.), *U.S. Strategy in Africa*, in *Études de l'IRSEM*, No. 36 (December 2014), p. 79-90, <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/base-de-medias/documents-telechargeables/irsem/pdf-publications/etudes/etude-de-l-irsem-n-36-en-2014>; European Commission EuropeAid website, *Africa-EU continental cooperation*, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/africa-eu-continental-cooperation_en.

⁷⁵ European External Action Service, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*, June 2016, p. 36, <http://europa>.

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a range of issues in SSA. This latest policy document can provide the basis for aligning approaches and increasing coordination between the EU and the US.

On regional organisations: Support for regional organisations has become increasingly important for US-SSA engagement. Regional strategies and cooperation with regional organisations have been developed for programmes on agriculture, food security and trade. In the areas of energy, security and health, however, work with regional organisations continues to be on a more *ad hoc* basis. Furthermore, USAID does not systematically work with or build capacity for RECs, as recognised by the AU, instead prioritising policy-relevant groupings. Activities in support of regional organisations and regional integration are, among others, discussed with EU policy-makers in the framework of the USAID-EuropeAid policy dialogues. These particular discussions, however, do not rank very high on the US's and the EU's respective agendas.⁷⁶ The EU Global Strategy, which calls for more flexibility and partnerships in engaging with regional groupings in Africa, including both regional and subregional organisations, and "functional cooperative formats in the region,"⁷⁷ presents an opportunity for greater EU-US coordination. Building on existing dialogues and policy orientations, the EU and the US should attempt to align their support for regional organisations, clarifying with African countries which organisations should be supported in order to avoid fragmenting further the regional integration processes.

On people: Prior to AFRICOM's creation, officials from DoD intended that the command's headquarters should include personnel from other agencies. Despite this goal, at its height in 2011, AFRICOM had less than 2 per cent of headquarters staff from other agencies.⁷⁸ Under the first High Representative, the EEAS successfully managed to integrate staff from EU institutions (European Commission and European Council) as well as diplomatic staff and military from member states. Furthermore, the EU's significant network of delegations and member state embassies should be leveraged to offset the US's weak presence on the ground in Africa. According to US officials, readings of situations on the ground tend to align, and cross-briefings relying on EU monitoring capacity are at times organised in countries where the US is not present.⁷⁹ Moreover, by cultivating a cadre of experts of a certain stature and experience, who could serve as points of reference and knowledge where the US lacks regional expertise, the EEAS would add significant value to existing EU-US cooperation.⁸⁰ In regard to security cooperation, for instance, Williams argues that the number of US practitioners with direct experience of UN or AU peace operations is small and that US personnel would

eu/!pr79yu.

⁷⁶ John Kotsopoulos and Madeleine Goerg, "Interregional Relations between North America and Africa", cit.

⁷⁷ European External Action Service, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*, cit., p. 34.

⁷⁸ David E. Brown, *AFRICOM at 5 years*, cit., p. 21-22.

⁷⁹ Interviews with senior US officials, 2016.

⁸⁰ Interviews with senior US experts, 2016.

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benefit from first-hand knowledge of operational realities in African crisis zones.⁸¹ The EU and its member states are natural partners to fill the gap.

On security cooperation: The EU Global Strategy marks a departure from previous strategies with its clear emphasis on interests. Both the EU and the US identify security as a core interest and see a link between internal and external security. On the ground, threat assessments also tend to be similar. Building on comparable assessments and existing frameworks for cooperation and coordination, the US and the EU should attempt to align their security cooperation with key African countries and regional organisations. While the EU places significant emphasis on support for the AU and other regional organisations, US-SSA security cooperation remains largely on a bilateral basis. Increased coordination would ensure more impact on the ground. Such coordination already exists for AU-led peacekeeping operations where the US and the EU match their funding structures to avoid duplication. Furthermore, in the area of security cooperation, which remains largely intergovernmental on the European side, the added layer of coordinating with member states is crucial. In the context of security cooperation with SSA, France and the UK play a key role. The quarterly dialogues on security and political issues between the US, France, and the UK could be broadened to include the EU. Sustained coordination between the four will prove even more important following the results of the UK referendum on EU membership. In the current context there is little indication that the upcoming administration, Democratic or Republican, would sharply deviate from the current strategy of a “light footprint” and “leading from behind.” The US has long been calling on European states to invest in their security and defence capabilities, a sentiment which is echoed in the EU Global Strategy. Despite limited support at home for boosting defence spending,⁸² European member states will need to up their capabilities to continue to be credible partners for the US.

On approaches to development: A striking feature of US development cooperation is the reliance of USAID on a wide network of private sector for-profit and non-profit implementing partners, which is viewed by US experts and officials as a strength, especially as non-governmental organisations and private sector actors are called upon to play a growing role in development cooperation.⁸³ While the EU has a strong advocacy component and track record of working with governments, its relationship with the private sector is more complicated. USAID’s ability to mobilise quickly and to use non-governmental channels can complement expertise of working through government routes in SSA to achieve common development goals. At the country level, EU delegations should have the leeway to

⁸¹ Paul D. Williams, “Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa”, cit.

⁸² Bruce Stokes, Richard Wike and Jacob Poushter, *Europeans Face the World Divided*, Pew Research Center, 13 June 2016, <http://pewrsr.ch/1WIdvUf>.

⁸³ Interviews with senior US experts and officials, 2016. See also Daniel F. Runde and Conor M. Savoy, “The Ecosystem of U.S. International Development Assistance. A Development and Foreign Policy Strategic Asset”, in *CSIS Reports*, October 2012, p. 4, <https://www.csis.org/node/23536>.

build on cross-briefings and joint demarches, and to explore ways of cooperating with their US counterparts on programming. According to Gaus and Hoxtell, USAID is reviewing its financial guidelines to allow transfers of funds between the US and the EU for cross-programming and implementation.⁸⁴ The EU Global Strategy reiterates the EU's commitment to partner with the private sector and civil society organisations, and it aims to do so "in traditional ways – through dialogue, cooperation and support – and through innovative formats such as exchanges, embedded personnel and joint facilities, harnessing knowledge and creativity in our system."⁸⁵ In thinking through both traditional and innovative ways of broadening the EU's base of partners, EU policy-makers should draw on the US Government's significant experience of working with these sectors.

On political dialogue: Existing coordination mechanisms at member-state level and EU level can also serve to increase complementarity between EU and US engagement in SSA. Bilateral dialogues take place between the US and the EU, the US and France, and the US and the UK on a monthly basis, and security and political issues are discussed among the US, France and the UK on a quarterly basis, with meetings rotating between the three capitals. Policy-makers from the US, France, the UK and the EU also meet at conferences, such as the UN General Assembly. Without overburdening the agendas, the regular political dialogues already in place are certainly a starting point from which to improve transatlantic coordination. Given the emphasis on the presidential initiatives of the Obama administration, one of the challenges for the US will be the continuity of engagement with SSA and ensuring the implementation of commitments. Pham argues that in the current political climate, both US political parties, Democratic and Republican, will need to demonstrate their ability to govern. Given the divisiveness of current political debates, the next administration will need to identify areas for bipartisan consensus.⁸⁶ Africa policy has historically been an area of relative bipartisan consensus and has seen significant continuity, which is likely to carry on with a Democratic administration. The political momentum around the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement could further encourage continuity and the implementation of existing commitments by the next administration. What will remain a challenge, however, is the asymmetry between what needs to be done in Africa, the US's narrow interests there and the American public's limited appetite for more global engagement. Although the EU's interests in Africa are more immediate, especially with regard to counterterrorism and organised crime, migration and border management, the public in the EU have also become increasingly inward looking.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ Alexander Gaus and Wade Hoxtell, *Connecting Security and Development: Towards a Transatlantic Strategy in Fragile States*, Brussels Forum Young Writers Award, March 2014, http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/user_upload/media/pub/2014/Gaus_Hoxtell_2014_GMFedit_Connecting_Security_Development_Transatlantic_Strategy.pdf.

⁸⁵ European External Action Service, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*, cit., p. 49.

⁸⁶ J. Peter Pham, What legacy will Barack Obama leave in Africa?, translation of "Quel héritage laissera Barack Obama en Afrique?", in *Pouvoirs d'Afrique*, No. 2 (February-March 2015), p. 18-27, <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/articles/23230>.

⁸⁷ Bruce Stokes, Richard Wike and Jacob Poushter, *Europeans Face the World Divided*, cit.

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Since this trend is unlikely to abate on either side of the Atlantic, the focus should remain on strengthening and broadening of existing mechanisms for dialogue and coordination between the EU (especially key member states) and the US, and ensuring the implementation of current commitments.

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